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Abstract. Population structure and spatial heterogeneity are integral components of evo-
lutionary dynamics, in general, and of evolution of cooperation, in particular. Structure
can promote the emergence of cooperation in some populations and suppress it in others.
Here, we provide results for weak selection to favor cooperation on regular graphs for any
configuration, meaning any arrangement of cooperators and defectors. Our results extend
previous work on fixation probabilities of single, randomly placed mutants. We find that for
any configuration cooperation is never favored for birth-death (BD) updating. In contrast,
for death-birth (DB) updating, we derive a simple, computationally tractable formula for
weak selection to favor cooperation when starting from any configuration containing any
number of cooperators and defectors. This formula elucidates two important features: (i)
the takeover of cooperation can be enhanced by the strategic placement of cooperators and
(ii) adding more cooperators to a configuration can sometimes suppress the evolution of co-
operation. These findings give a formal account for how selection acts on all transient states
that appear in evolutionary trajectories. They also inform the strategic design of initial
states in social networks to maximally promote cooperation. We also derive general results
that characterize the interaction of any two strategies, not only cooperation and defection.
1. Introduction
Mechanisms favoring the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas have become central
focuses of evolutionary game theory in recent years [8, 46, 85]. The dilemma of coopera-
tion, which is characterized by conflicts of interest between individuals and groups, poses a
significant challenge to models of evolution since many of these models predict that cooper-
ation cannot persist in the presence of exploitation by defectors [45, 48]. Yet cooperation is
widely observed in nature, and the spatial assortment that results from population structure
is one element that can promote its emergence. In fact, spatial structure is among the most
salient determinants of the evolutionary dynamics of a population [4, 12, 14, 20, 22, 23, 25–
30, 35, 47, 49, 58, 61, 62, 65, 68, 70, 71, 76].
In social dilemmas, population structure can allow for the emergence of localized cooper-
ative clusters that would normally be outcompeted by defectors in well-mixed populations
[48, 60]. However, whether population structure promotes or suppresses cooperation depends
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on a number of factors such as the update rule, the type of social dilemma, and the spatial
details of the structure (which determines the extent of local competition [see 11, 76]). For
example, cooperation need not be favored in prisoner’s dilemma interactions under all up-
date rules [2, 52, 53, 74]. As a consequence, population structure should be considered in
the context of the game and the underlying update rule.
In the donation game, a cooperator (C) pays a cost, c, to provide the opponent with a
benefit, b, and a defector (D) pays no cost and provides no benefit [67]. Provided b ą c ą 0,
this game represents a prisoner’s dilemma since then the unique Nash equilibrium is mutual
defection, but both players would prefer the payoff from mutual cooperation [39]. In addition
to representing one of the most important social dilemmas, the donation game also admits
a simple way in which to quantify the efficiency of cooperation: the benefit-to-cost ratio,
b{c. As this ratio gets larger, the act of cooperation has a more profound effect on the
opponent relative to the cost paid by the cooperator. As we shall see, for any configuration
of cooperators and defectors, this ratio is a vital indicator of the evolutionary performance
of cooperation.
Evolutionary graph theory is a framework for studying evolution in structured populations
[6, 7, 9, 11, 33, 38, 52, 53, 64, 66, 69, 72, 75, 77]. In a graph-structured population, the players
reside on the vertices and the edges indicate who is a neighbor of whom. In fact, there are
two types of neighborhoods: (i) those that generate payoffs (“interaction neighborhoods”)
and (ii) those that are relevant for evolutionary updating (“dispersal neighborhoods”). Thus,
an evolutionary graph is actually a pair of graphs consisting of an interaction graph and a
dispersal graph [54, 55, 57, 75]. As in many other studies, we assume that the interaction
and dispersal graphs are the same. Other extensions of evolutionary graph theory involve
dynamic graphs, which allow the population structure to change during evolutionary updat-
ing [3, 73, 79, 84]. Our focus is on static, regular graphs of degree k, meaning the population
size, N , is fixed and each player has exactly k neighbors.
We study two prominent update rules: birth-death (BD) and death-birth (DB). In both
processes, players are arranged on a graph and accumulate payoffs by interacting with all
of their neighbors. This payoff, pi, is then converted to fitness, f , via f “ 1 ` wpi, where
w ě 0 is the intensity of selection [48]. For BD updating [42, 48], a player is chosen with
probability proportional to fitness for reproduction; the offspring of this player then replaces
a random neighbor (who dies). For DB updating [52], a player is chosen uniformly at random
for death; a neighbor of this player then reproduces (with probability proportional to fitness)
and the offspring fills the vacancy. For each of these processes, we assume that w is small,
which means selection is weak. Weak selection is often a biologically meaningful assumption
since an individual might possess many traits (strategies), and each trait makes only a small
contribution to fitness [1, 15, 43, 48, 80–82].
The effects of selection on fixation probability have been studied chiefly for states with just
a single cooperator since, if the mutation rate is small, the process will reach a monomorphic
state prior to the appearance of another cooperator through mutation [16, 83]. Although
small mutation rates are often reasonable from a biological standpoint [5, 36, 37, 56], there are
several reasons to study arbitrary cooperator configurations. Even when starting from a state
with a single cooperator, an evolutionary process typically transitions subsequently through
states with many cooperators. From a mathematical standpoint, it is therefore natural to
ask how selection affects the fixation probability of cooperators from each possible transient
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state that might arise in an evolutionary trajectory. Furthermore, many-mutant states could
arise through migration [19, 41, 51, 59] or environmental mutagenic agents [44, 50], which,
even when rare, might result in several cooperators entering the population at once. In
the case of social networks, cooperators could arise through design rather than mutation or
exploration; if cooperators can be strategically planted within the population, then one can
ask how to do so in order to maximize the chances that cooperators take over. Therefore,
the effects of selection on arbitrary numbers and configurations of cooperators and defectors
play an important role in the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation.
When starting from a configuration with n cooperators and N´n defectors, weak selection
is said to favor the evolution of cooperation (on a regular graph) if the probability that
cooperators fixate exceeds n{N if w is sufficiently small but positive. This comparison is
based on the fact that the fixation probability of n cooperators for neutral drift (w “ 0) is
n{N . Ohtsuki et al. [52] show that, on large regular graphs of degree k, selection favors the
fixation of a single, randomly-placed cooperator under DB updating as long as
b
c
ą k. (1)
Taylor et al. [75] show that for finite bi-transitive graphs of size N and degree k, the condition
for selection to favor the fixation of a single cooperator is
b
c
ą k pN ´ 2q
N ´ 2k . (2)
Bi-transitive graphs constitute a subset of regular graphs.
In another refinement of the ‘b{c ą k’ result, Chen [9] shows that, for any n with
0 ă n ă N , selection favors cooperation when starting from a random configuration of
n cooperators and N ´ n defectors on a regular graph of size N and degree k if and only
if Eq. (2) holds. (Note that regularity is a weaker requirement on the population structure
than bi-transitivity.) This ratio, which characterizes when selection increases the fixation
probability of cooperators, is independent of the location of the mutants, despite the fact
that the probability of fixation itself depends on the location [40]. As the population size,
N , gets large, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio of Eq. (2) approaches k, which recovers the
result of Ohtsuki et al. [52]. Our goal here is to move beyond Eq. (2) and give an explicit,
computationally feasible critical benefit-to-cost ratio for any configuration of cooperators
and defectors on any regular graph.
Given the profusion of possible ways to structure a population of a fixed size, it quickly
becomes difficult to determine when a population structure favors the evolution of coopera-
tion. Here, we provide a solution to this problem for BD and DB updating on regular graphs.
We show that, for any configuration of cooperators and defectors, (i) cooperation is never
favored for BD updating, and (ii) for DB updating, there exists a simple, explicit critical
benefit-to-cost ratio that characterizes when selection favors the emergence of cooperation.
Moreover, if N is the population size and k is the degree of the graph, then the complexity
of calculating this ratio is O pk2Nq, and, in particular, linear in N . Thus, while the calcula-
tions of fixation probabilities in structured populations are famously intractable [21, 24, 78],
the determination of whether or not selection increases the probability of fixation, for weak
selection, is markedly simpler.
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In addition to providing a computationally feasible way of determining whether selection
favors cooperation on a particular graph, our results highlight the importance of the initial
configuration for the emergence of cooperation. Depending on the graph, adding additional
cooperators to the initial condition can either suppress or promote the evolution of coop-
eration. A careful choice of configuration of cooperators and defectors can minimize the
critical benefit-to-cost ratio for selection to favor cooperation. If cooperation is not favored
by selection in such a strategically chosen initial state, then it cannot be favored under any
other initial configuration. In this sense, there exists a configuration that is most conducive
to the evolution of cooperation, which is not apparent from looking at single-cooperator
configurations or random configurations with n cooperators since these initial configurations
need not minimize the critical benefit-to-cost ratio.
2. Results
2.1. Critical benefit-to-cost ratios. Let ξ be a configuration of cooperators and defectors
on a fixed regular graph of size N and degree k, and let C denote the configuration consisting
solely of cooperators. For the donation game, the probability that cooperators take over the
population when starting from state ξ may be viewed as a function of the selection intensity,
ρξ,C pwq. We consider here the following question: when does weak selection increase the
probability that cooperators fixate? In other words, when is ρξ,C pwq ą ρξ,C p0q for sufficiently
small w ą 0? Note that if there are n cooperators in state ξ, then ρξ,C p0q “ n{N , so this
condition is equivalent to ρξ,C pwq ą n{N for small w ą 0.
To answer this question, we first need to introduce some notation. If x is a vertex of the
graph and ξ is a configuration, then let f1 px, ξq and f0 px, ξq be the frequencies of cooperators
and defectors, respectively, among the neighbors of the player at vertex x. Similarly, let
f10 px, ξq be the fraction of paths of length two, starting at x, that consist of a cooperator
followed by a defector. From these quantities, let
f1 :“ 1
N
ÿ
xPV
f1 px, ξq ; (3a)
f0 :“ 1
N
ÿ
xPV
f0 px, ξq ; (3b)
f10 :“ 1
N
ÿ
xPV
f10 px, ξq ; (3c)
f1f0 :“ 1
N
ÿ
xPV
f1 px, ξq f0 px, ξq , (3d)
which are obtained by averaging these ‘local frequencies’ over all of the players in the popu-
lation. From these local frequencies, which are straightforward to calculate (see Fig. 1), we
obtain our main result: for small w ą 0, ρξ,C pwq ą ρξ,C p0q if and only if the benefit-to-cost
ratio exceeds the critical valueˆ
b
c
˙˚
ξ
“ k
`
Nf1 ¨ f0 ´ f10
˘
Nf1 ¨ f0 ´ kf10 ´ kf1f0 (4)
whenever the denominator is positive (and 8 otherwise). Since the calculations of f1, f0,
and f1f0 are O pkNq and the calculation of f10 is O pk2Nq, it follows that the complexity of
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Figure 1. Calculation of the local frequencies of Eq. (3), f1 px, ξq, f0 px, ξq, and f10 px, ξq, where
ξ is the configuration consisting of a defector at vertex y and cooperators elsewhere. Among the
three neighbors of the player at vertex x, two are cooperators (u and v) and one is a defector (y);
thus, f1 px, ξq “ 2{3 and f0 px, ξq “ 1{3. Furthermore, of the nine paths of length two that begin
at vertex x, only two (x Ñ u Ñ y and x Ñ v Ñ y) consist of a cooperator followed by a defector,
and it follows that f10 px, ξq “ 2{9.
finding the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is O pk2Nq, so it is feasible to calculate even when
the population is large. Note also that if pξ is the state obtained by swapping cooperators
and defectors in ξ, then both ξ and pξ have the same critical benefit-to-cost ratio. We discuss
these ‘conjugate’ states further in our treatment of structure coefficients.
When ξ has just a single cooperator, the ratio of Eq. (5) reduces to that of Eq. (2),
which, in particular, does not depend on the location of the cooperator. This property is
notable because the fixation probability itself usually does depend on the location of the
cooperator, even on regular graphs [40]. We show in Methods that one recovers from Eq. (4)
the result of Chen [9] that Eq. (2) gives the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for a randomly-chosen
configuration with a fixed number of cooperators.
For fixed k ě 2, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio in Eq. (4) converges uniformly to k
as N Ñ 8 (see Methods). Therefore, on sufficiently large graphs, the critical ratio is
approximated by k for any configuration, regardless of the number of cooperators. As a
result, on large graphs there is less of a distinction between the various transient (non-
monomorphic) states in terms of whether or not selection favors the fixation of cooperators.
On smaller graphs, these transient states can behave quite differently from one another. This
effect is particularly pronounced on very small social networks in which cooperators can be
strategically planted in the population to ensure that cooperators are favored by selection.
2.1.1. Strategic placement of cooperators in (small) social networks. Among the more inter-
esting consequences of Eq. (4) are its implications for the success of cooperators as a function
of the initial configuration. Recall that Eq. (2) gives the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for both
(i) configurations with a single cooperator and (ii) random configurations with a fixed num-
ber of cooperators. When cooperators and defectors are configured randomly, this critical
ratio is independent of the number of cooperators, which suggests that the effects of selection
cannot be improved by increasing the initial abundance of cooperators.
Eq. (4), on the other hand, shows that the initial configuration of cooperators, including
their abundance, does affect how selection acts on the population. First of all, there are
graphs for which the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is infinite for configurations with a single
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(a) pb{cq˚ “ 42; σ « 1.05 (b) pb{cq˚ “ 8; σ “ 1
Figure 2. Two graphs showing configurations of cooperators (blue) and defectors (red). (a) Co-
operation can be favored for the initial condition that is shown since the critical benefit-to-cost
ratio is 42 and, in particular, finite. However, the fixation of cooperation cannot be favored for any
initial configuration with a single cooperator on this graph. (b) Cooperation cannot be favored for
the initial condition that is shown since the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is infinite. However, any
initial configuration with a single cooperator has a critical benefit-to-cost ratio of 28. Therefore,
the addition of cooperators to the initial configuration can either favor cooperation, (a), or suppress
it, (b). The critical benefit-to-cost ratio can also be expressed in terms of a well-known quantity
known as a “structure coefficient,” σ, which satisfies pb{cq˚ “ pσ ` 1q { pσ ´ 1q.
cooperator but finite for some configurations with multiple cooperators (see Fig. 2(a)). In
contrast, there are graphs for which this ratio is finite for configurations with a single co-
operator but infinite for some states with multiple cooperators (see Fig. 2(b)). Therefore,
despite the fact that the critical ratio for a single mutant is the same as the critical ratio for
a random configuration with any fixed number of mutants, the critical ratio does (in general)
depend on the number of mutants present in the configuration.
We say that a configuration has isolated cooperators (resp. defectors) if the minimum
distance between any two cooperators (resp. defectors) is at least three steps. Let N0 denote
the maximum number of isolated strategies that a configuration can carry. (Examples of
configurations with isolated cooperators on a graph with N0 “ 3 are given in Fig. 3.) If
a strategy (cooperate or defect) appears only once in a configuration, then that strategy is
clearly isolated, so N0 ě 1. We show in Methods that if N ą 2k, then cooperation can
be favored for a mixed initial condition with n cooperators whenever 1 ď n ď N0 ` 1 or
1 ď N ´ n ď N0 ` 1, and, moreover, these bounds on n are sharp. Stated differently, under
these conditions any configuration with n cooperators has a finite critical benefit-to-cost
ratio. Furthermore, if N0 ě 2, then, for any n with 2 ď n ď N0, there exists a configuration
with n cooperators whose critical ratio is strictly less than the ratio for a single cooperator
(Eq. (2)). Such a configuration necessarily has no isolated strategies since the minimum
critical ratio among configurations with an isolated strategy is attained by any state with
just a single cooperator.
The strategic placement of cooperators and defectors can therefore produce a critical
benefit-to-cost ratio that is less than the ratio for a single cooperator among defectors. In
fact, starting from a configuration with just one cooperator, one can reduce this critical
ratio by placing a second cooperator adjacent to the first cooperator (see Methods). If b{c
lies below Eq. (2) and above Eq. (4), then a strategically chosen configuration can ensure
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(a) pb{cq˚ “ 5 (b) pb{cq˚ « 4.67 (c) pb{cq˚ « 4.38
(d) pb{cq˚ « 3.94 (e) pb{cq˚ « 3.64 (f) pb{cq˚ « 3.80
(g) pb{cq˚ “ 5 (h) pb{cq˚ “ 5.4 (i) pb{cq˚ “ 6
Figure 3. Configurations of cooperators and defectors on the Frucht graph, a 3-regular graph
with 12 vertices and no non-trivial symmetries [see 13]. Panels (a)-(f) show the effects on the
critical benefit-to-cost ratio of adding additional cooperators to the initial state. Panel (e) shows
the global minimum of pb{cq˚ξ , which is achieved by just (e) and its conjugate; adding additional
cooperators to the configuration in (e) only increases pb{cq˚ξ . The configuration of (e) is ‘optimal’
for cooperation in the sense that if selection increases the fixation probability of cooperators in
some state, then it does so in state (e) as well. Relative to all possible initial states, selection can
increase the fixation probability of cooperators in (e) under the smallest b{c ratio. Panels (g)-(i)
show that when cooperators are added in a different order (starting with just a single cooperator),
the critical benefit-to-cost ratio can actually be increased. Each of these three configurations has
isolated cooperators, and (i) gives the global maximum of pb{cq˚ξ , which is achieved by just (i) and
its conjugate. Since N0 “ 3, (i) is a maximal isolated configuration. The initial state in (i) is least
conducive to cooperation in the sense that, relative to all other initial configurations, (i) requires
the largest b{c ratio for selection to increase the fixation probability of cooperators. If selection
increases this fixation probability when starting from state (i), then it does so when starting from
any other mixed initial configuration.
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that the fixation of cooperation is favored by selection even if it is disfavored for any single-
cooperator state. This behavior is particularly pronounced on small social networks, where
the critical ratios take on a significant range of values (see Fig. 3), and less apparent on large
networks, where the critical ratios are much closer to the degree of the graph, k. Fortunately,
on small networks it is easier to directly search for configurations that have small critical
benefit-to-cost ratios via Eq. (4).
2.2. Structure coefficients. Consider now a generic 2ˆ 2 game whose payoff matrix is
˜A B
A a b
B c d
¸
. (5)
The donation game is a special case of this game with A indicating a cooperator and B
indicating a defector. If A denotes the monomorphic state consisting of only A-players and
if ξ is a configuration of A- and B-players, then a natural generalization of the question we
asked for the donation game is the following: when is ρξ,A pwq ą ρξ,A p0q for sufficiently small
w ą 0? That is, when does (weak) selection favor the fixation of A when starting from state
ξ? For technical reasons, this question is more difficult to answer when the payoff matrix
is Eq. (5) instead of that of the donation game. There is, however, an alternative way of
generalizing the critical benefit-to-cost ratio to Eq. (5).
When considering the evolutionary success of strategy A based on configurations with
only one mutant, another standard measure is whether the fixation probability of a single
A-mutant in a B-population exceeds that of a single B-mutant in an A-population [see 74,
Eq. 2]. That is, one compares the fixation probability of A to the fixation probability of B
after swapping A and B in the initial state. This interchange of strategies may be defined for
any initial state: formally, if ξ is a configuration of A-players and B-players, the conjugate of
ξ, written pξ, is the state obtained by swapping A and B in ξ. In other words, the A-players
in ξ are the B-players in pξ.
A natural generalization of this criterion to arbitrary configurations involves comparing
the fixation probability of A in ξ to the fixation probability of B in pξ. Let A and B be
the monomorphic states consisting of all A-players and all B-players, respectively. In this
context, our main result is that ρξ,A pwq ą ρpξ,B pwq for all sufficiently small w ą 0 if and
only if
σξa` b ą c` σξd, (6)
where, for the DB updating,
σξ “ N
`
1` 1
k
˘
f1 ¨ f0 ´ 2f10 ´ f1f0
N
`
1´ 1
k
˘
f1 ¨ f0 ` f1f0 . (7)
In Methods, we give an explicit formula for the structure coefficient, σξ, for BD updating as
well. Just as it is for the critical benefit-to-cost ratio of Eq. (4), the complexity of calculating
σξ is O pk2Nq. In fact, the relationship between pb{cq˚ξ and σξ is remarkably straightforward:ˆ
b
c
˙˚
ξ
“ σξ ` 1
σξ ´ 1 , (8)
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which, for DB updating, generalizes a result of Tarnita et al. [74] to arbitrary configurations.
Note that the critical benefit-to-cost ratio increases as σξ decreases. Moreover, unlike the
critical benefit-to-cost ratio, σξ is always finite. Interestingly, both pb{cq˚ξ and σξ are invariant
under conjugation, meaning they are the same for pξ as they are for ξ.
For the donation game, Eq. (6) is equivalent to b{c ą pb{cq˚ξ . Of course, Eq. (6) applies
to a broader class of games as well and represents a simple way to compare the success of
a strategy (A) relative to its alternative (B) when selection is weak. In this sense, Eq. (6)
may be thought of as a generalization of the critical benefit-to-cost rule to arbitrary 2 ˆ 2
games.
3. Discussion
Selection always opposes the emergence of cooperation for BD updating, regardless of
the configuration of cooperators and defectors (see Methods). This result is consistent with
previous studies showing that cooperation cannot be favored under random configurations
[17, 18, 52, 53], and it specifies further that cooperation cannot be favored under any con-
figuration. For general 2ˆ 2 games given by Eq. (5), we show in Methods that one can also
find a simple formula for σξ in the selection condition of Eq. (6) that can be easily calculated
for a given graph.
Remarkably, for DB updating, both the critical benefit-to-cost ratio and σξ depend on
only local properties of the configuration, which makes these quantities straightforward to
calculate. Furthermore, the complexity of calculating both of these quantities is O pk2Nq,
where N is the size of the population and k is the degree of the graph, so they are compu-
tationally feasible even on large graphs. Therefore, our results provide a tractable way of
determining whether or not selection favors cooperation for any configuration.
Finding an optimal configuration, which is one that minimizes the critical benefit-to-cost
ratio, seems to be a difficult nonlinear optimization problem. The critical ratio is easily
computed for any given configuration, but a graph of size N has 2N possible configurations,
which makes a brute-force search unfeasible for all but small N . Our results qualitatively
show that both the abundance and the configuration of cooperators can strongly influence the
effects of selection. We leave as an open problem whether it is possible to find a polynomial-
time algorithm that produces an optimal configuration on any regular graph. However,
since Eq. (4) is extremely easy to compute for a given configuration, and since small graphs
generally exhibit broader variations of critical ratios than do larger graphs (since pb{cq˚ξ Ñ k
uniformly as N Ñ 8), it is typically feasible to find a state that is more conducive to
cooperation than a random configuration.
Our analysis of arbitrary configurations uncovers two important features of the process
with DB updating: (i) there exist graphs that suppress the spread of cooperation when
starting from a single mutant but promote the spread of cooperation when starting from
configurations with multiple mutants (Fig. 2(a)), and (ii) there exist graphs that promote
the spread of cooperation when starting from a single mutant but suppress the spread of
cooperation when starting from configurations with many mutants (Fig. 2(b)). The proper
initial configuration is thus a crucial determinant of the evolutionary dynamics, and our
results help to engineer initial conditions that promote the emergence of cooperation on
social networks. More importantly, these results provide deeper mathematical insights into
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the complicated problem of how selection affects the outcome of an evolutionary process at
each point along an evolutionary trajectory.
4. Methods
4.1. Notation and general setup. In what follows, the population structure is given by
a simple, connected, k-regular graph, G “ pV,Eq, where V denotes the vertex set of G and
E denotes the edge set. For x, y P V , we write x „ y to indicate that x and y are neighbors,
i.e. px, yq P E. Throughout the paper, we assume that #V “ N is finite and k ě 2.
The payoff matrix for a generic game with strategies A and B is
˜A B
A a b
B c d
¸
. (9)
A configuration on G, denoted ξ, is a function from V to t0, 1u. If ξ pxq “ 1, then the player
at vertex x is using A; otherwise, this player is using B. A special case of Eq. (9) is the
donation game,
˜ C D
C b´ c ´c
D b 0
¸
. (10)
When we are considering the donation game, ξ pxq “ 1 indicates a cooperator at vertex x
and ξ pxq “ 0 indicates a defector at vertex x. For any such configuration, ξ, the conjugate
configuration, pξ, is defined as pξ pxq “ 1 ´ ξ pxq for x P V . In other words, pξ pxq “ 0 if
ξ pxq “ 1 and pξ pxq “ 1 if ξ pxq “ 0.
For any configuration, ξ, on a k-regular graph, G, and for x P V and i, j P t0, 1u, let
fi px, ξq “ # ty P V : x „ y and ξ pyq “ iu
k
; (11a)
fij px, ξq “ # tpy, zq P V ˆ V : x „ y „ z, ξ pyq “ i, and ξ pzq “ ju
k2
. (11b)
For any function, f px, ξq, let
f pξq :“ 1
N
ÿ
xPV
f px, ξq (12)
be the arithmetic average of f with respect to the vertices of G. (Fig. 1 in the main text
gives an example of how these quantities are calculated.) The arithmetic averages of the
functions formed from these local frequencies admit simple probabilistic interpretations: If
a random walk is performed on the graph at a starting point chosen uniformly-at-random,
then f1 pξq (resp. f0 pξq “ 1 ´ f1 pξq) is the probability that the player at the first step is
a cooperator (resp. a defector), and f10 pξq is the probability that the player at the first
step is a cooperator and the player at the second step is a defector. If two independent
random walks are performed at the same starting point, then f1f0 pξq is the probability of
finding a cooperator at step one in the first random walk and a defector at step one in the
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second random walk. If one chooses an enumeration of the vertices and represents G by an
adjacency matrix, Γ, and ξ as a column vector, then
f10 pξq “ 1
kN
ξᵀΓpξ; (13a)
f1f0 pξq “ 1
k2N
ξᵀΓ2pξ, (13b)
which gives a simple, alternative way to calculate each of f10 pξq and f1f0 pξq.
Let w ě 0 be a sufficiently small selection intensity. The effective payoff of an i-player at
vertex x in configuration ξ, denoted ewi px, ξq, for the game whose payoffs are given by the
generic matrix of Eq. (9), is defined via
ew1 px, ξq “ 1` wk raf1 px, ξq ` bf0 px, ξqs ; (14a)
ew0 px, ξq “ 1` wk rcf1 px, ξq ` df0 px, ξqs . (14b)
The basic measure we use here to define the evolutionary success of a strategy is fixation
probability. If X is a strategy (either in tA,Bu or in tC,Du), let X denote the monomorphic
configuration in which every player uses X. For any configuration, ξ, and a fixed game, we
write ρξ,X pwq to denote the probability that strategy X fixates in the population given an
initial configuration, ξ, and selection intensity, w.
In the following sections, we consider DB and BD updating under weak selection (w ! 1).
4.2. DB updating. Under DB updating, a player is first selected for death uniformly-at-
random from the population. The neighbors of this player then compete to reproduce, with
probability proportional to fitness (effective payoff), and the offspring of the reproducing
player fills the vacancy. We assume that the strategy of the offspring is inherited from the
parent. Therefore, if the player at vertex x dies when the state of the population is ξ, then
the probability that this vacancy is filled by an i-player is
piwi px, ξq “
ÿ
yPV : y„x
ewi py, ξq1ξpyq“iÿ
yPV : y„x
”
ew1 py, ξq ξ pyq ` ew0 py, ξq pξ pyqı . (15)
This DB update rule defines a rate-N pure-jump Markov chain, where N is the size of the
population. When w “ 0, this process reduces to the voter model such that, at each update
time, a random individual adopts the strategy of a random neighbor [see 34].
4.2.1. Critical benefit-to-cost ratios. Recall that our goal is to determine when, for any con-
figuration, ξ, ρξ,C pwq ą ρξ,C p0q for all sufficiently small w ą 0. We first need some technical
lemmas:
Lemma 1. For any configuration, ξ, we have the following first-order expansion as w Ñ 0`:
ρξ,C pwq “ ρξ,C p0q ` w
˜
ak
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f0f11 pξtq
ı
dt` bk
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f0f10 pξtq
ı
dt
´ ck
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f01 pξtq
ı
dt´ dk
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f00 pξtq
ı
dt
¸
`O `w2˘ .
(16)
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Proof. By Theorem 3.8 in [9], we have
ρξ,C pwq “ ρξ,C p0q ` w
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
D pξtq
ı
dt`O `w2˘ (17)
whenever w is sufficiently small, where
D pξq “ 1
N
ÿ
xPV
´pξ pxqh1 px, ξq ´ ξ pxqh0 px, ξq¯; (18a)
hi px, ξq “ d
dw
ˇˇˇ
w“0
piwi px, ξq . (18b)
By the definition of piwi , Eq. (15), we have
h1 px, ξq “ akf0f11 px, ξq ` bkf0f10 px, ξq ´ ckf1f01 px, ξq ´ dkf1f00 px, ξq ; (19a)
h0 px, ξq “ ´h1 px, ξq , (19b)
so Eq. (16) follows at once from Eq. (17), which completes the proof. 
Remark 1. The approach of studying fixation probabilities via first-order expansions, as in
Eq. (17), also appears in [63], [32], and [31]. The proof of Eq. (17) in [9], which is valid un-
der mild assumptions on the game dynamics, was obtained independently and is a particular
consequence of a series-like expansion for fixation probabilities. In addition to the identifica-
tion of the first-order coefficients
ş8
0
E0ξ
”
D pξtq
ı
dt in selection strength, w, in Eq. (17), the
proof of this series-like expansion obtains a bound for the O pw2q error terms that is explicit
in selection strength and the rate to reach monomorphic configurations of the underlying
game dynamics. Therefore, one can deduce an explicit range of selection strengths such that
the comparison of fixation probabilities requires only the sign of
ş8
0
E0ξ
”
D pξtq
ı
dt. We refer
the reader to [81] for a further discussion of selection strengths and their consequences for
the comparison of fixation probabilities.
In order to compute the voter-model integrals in Eq. (16), we now turn to coalescing
random walks on graphs. Suppose that tBxuxPV is a system of rate-1 coalescing random
walks on G, where, for each x P V , Bx starts at x. These interacting random walks move
independently of one another until they meet, and thereafter they move together. The
duality between the voter model and these random walks is given by
E0ξ
«ź
xPS
ξt pxq
ff
“ E
«ź
xPS
ξ pBxt q
ff
(20)
for each S Ď V , t ą 0, and strategy configuration, ξ. For more information on this duality,
including a proof of Eq. (20) and its graphical representation, see §III.4 and §III.6 in [34].
Consider now two discrete-time random walks on G, pXnqně0 and pYnqně0, that start at
the same vertex and are independent of tBxuxPV . If the common starting point is x P V ,
then we write Ex to denote the expectation with respect to this starting point. If the starting
point is chosen with respect to the uniform distribution, pi, then this expectation is denoted
by Epi. The random-walk probabilities, Px and Ppi, are understood in the same way. Sinceÿ
xPV
1
N
ξ pxq
ÿ
yPV : y„x
1
k
pξ pyq “ Epi ”ξ pX0q pξ pX1qı, for example, we will use these random walks
to save notation when we compute the local frequencies of strategy configurations.
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Lemma 2. If f˚0 :“ f10 ` f00, then, for any configuration, ξ, we haveż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f10 pξtq
ı
dt “ Nf1 pξq f0 pξq
2
; (21a)ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f0 pξtq
ı
dt “ Nf1 pξq f0 pξq
2
´ f10 pξq
2
; (21b)ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f˚0 pξtq
ı
dt “ N
`
1` 1
k
˘
f1 pξq f0 pξq
2
´ f10 pξq
2
´ f1f0 pξq
2
. (21c)
Proof. For any configuration, ξ, and any t ą 0,
E0ξ
”
f1 pξtq f0 pξtq
ı
“ f1 pξq f0 pξq ´ 2
N
ż t
0
E0ξ
”
f10 pξsq
ı
ds (22)
by Theorem 3.1 in [10]. See also Section 3 in that reference for discussions and related results
of Eq. (22) in terms of coalescing random walks. Moreover, for any vertices x and y with
x ‰ y, we have
E
”
ξ pBxt q pξ pByt qı “ e´2tξ pxq pξ pyq
`
ż t
0
e´2pt´sq
˜ ÿ
zPV : z„x
1
k
E
”
ξ pBzs q pξ pBys qı` ÿ
zPV : z„y
1
k
E
”
ξ pBxs q pξ pBzs qı
¸
ds,
(23)
which is obtained by considering whether the first epoch time of the bivariate Markov chain
pBx, Byq occurs before time t or not. Notice that Eq. (23) is false if x “ y since the left-
hand side vanishes but the integral term on the right-hand side is, in general, nonzero. This
fact needs to be kept in mind when Eq. (23) is applied. Furthermore, using the duality of
Eq. (20), the voter-model integrals in question areż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f10 pξtq
ı
dt “
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX1t ˘ı dt; (24a)ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f0 pξtq
ı
dt “
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX2t ˘ı dt; (24b)ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f˚0 pξtq
ı
dt “
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX3t ˘ı dt. (24c)
We are now in a position to establish Eq. (21). By letting t Ñ 8 in Eq. (22), we obtain
Eq. (21a) since f1 ¨ f0 vanishes at monomorphic configurations. Since the graph has no self-
loops, we have X0 ‰ X1 almost surely, thus, by Eq. (23) and the reversibility of the chain
pXnqně0 under Ppi, we have
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX1t ˘ı “ e´2tEpi ”ξ pX0q pξ pX1qı
`
ż t
0
e´2pt´sq
´
Epi
”
ξ
`
BY1s
˘ pξ `BX1s ˘ı` Epi ”ξ `BX0s ˘ pξ `BX2s ˘ı¯ ds
“ e´2tEpi
”
ξ pX0q pξ pX1qı` ż t
0
2e´2pt´sqEpi
”
ξ
`
BX0s
˘ pξ `BX2s ˘ı ds. (25)
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Integrating both sides of this equation with respect to t over p0,8q implies that
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX2t ˘ı dt “ ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX1t ˘ı dt´ Epi
”
ξ pX0q pξ pX1qı
2
, (26)
which, by Eqs. (21a), (24a), and (24b), gives Eq. (21b).
The proof of the one remaining equation, Eq. (21c), is similar except that we have to
take into account the fact that Ppi pX0 “ X2q ą 0 when applying Eq. (23). By reversibility,
pY1, X0, X1, X2q and pX3, X2, X1, X0q have the same distribution under Ppi. Therefore, by
Eq. (23), it follows that
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX2t ˘ı
“ e´2tEpi
”
ξ pX0q pξ pX2qı
`
ż t
0
e´2pt´sq
´
Epi
”
ξ
`
BY1s
˘ pξ `BX2s ˘1tX0‰X2uı` Epi ”ξ `BX0s ˘ pξ `BX3s ˘1tX0‰X2uı¯ ds
“ e´2tEpi
”
ξ pX0q pξ pX2qı
`
ż t
0
e´2pt´sq
´
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX3s
˘ pξ `BX0s ˘1tX0‰X2uı` Epi ”ξ `BX0s ˘ pξ `BX3s ˘1tX0‰X2uı¯ ds.
(27)
Integrating both sides of this equation with respect to t over p0,8q yields
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX2t ˘ı dt “ Epi
”
ξ pX0q pξ pX2qı
2
` 1
2
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX3t
˘ pξ `BX0t ˘1tX0‰X2uı dt
` 1
2
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX3t ˘1tX0‰X2uı dt, (28)
from which we obtainż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX3t ˘ı dt
“ 1
2
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX3t
˘ pξ `BX0t ˘ı dt` 12
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX3t ˘ı dt
“ 1
2
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX3t
˘ pξ `BX0t ˘1tX0‰X2uı dt` 12
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX3t
˘ pξ `BX0t ˘1tX0“X2uı dt
` 1
2
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX3t ˘1tX0‰X2uı dt` 12
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX3t ˘1tX0“X2uı dt
“
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX2t ˘ı dt´ Epi
”
ξ pX0q pξ pX2qı
2
` 1
2
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX3t
˘ pξ `BX2t ˘1tX0“X2uı dt` 12
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX2t
˘ pξ `BX3t ˘1tX0“X2uı dt
14
“
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX2t ˘ı dt´ Epi
”
ξ pX0q pξ pX2qı
2
` 1
2k
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX1t
˘ pξ `BX0t ˘ı dt` 12k
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX1t ˘ı dt
“
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX2t ˘ı dt´ Epi
”
ξ pX0q pξ pX2qı
2
` 1
k
ż 8
0
Epi
”
ξ
`
BX0t
˘ pξ `BX1t ˘ı dt.
(29)
The first and last equalities follow from reversibility, the third equality from Eq. (28), and
the fourth equality from the Markov property of pXnqně0 at n “ 0, 2 and the fact that
Px pX0 “ X2q “ 1{k since the graph is regular. Eq. (21c) then follows from Eqs. (21a),
(21b), (24c), and (29). 
We are now in a position to prove the first of our main results:
Theorem 1. In the donation game, for any configuration, ξ, we have the following expansion
as w Ñ 0`:
ρξ,C pwq “ ρξ,C p0q ` w
2
!
b
“
Nf1 pξq f0 pξq ´ kf10 pξq ´ kf1f0 pξq
‰
´ c “kNf1 pξq f0 pξq ´ kf10 pξq‰ )`O `w2˘ . (30)
Proof. By Lemma 1, it suffices to obtain the coefficient of w, i.e. the first order term, on
the right-hand side of Eq. (16). Since the game under consideration is the donation game, a
simple calculation givesż 8
0
E0ξ
”
D pξtq
ı
dt “ bk
ˆż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f˚0 pξtq
ı
dt´
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f10 pξtq
ı
dt
˙
´ ck
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f0 pξtq
ı
dt.
(31)
Therefore, Eq. (30) follows from the calculations of Lemma 2, which completes the proof. 
From Theorem 1, we see that, for small w ą 0,
ρξ,C pwq ą ρξ,C p0q ðñ b
c
ą k
`
Nf1 pξq f0 pξq ´ f10 pξq
˘
Nf1 pξq f0 pξq ´ kf10 pξq ´ kf1f0 pξq “:
ˆ
b
c
˙˚
ξ
, (32)
which gives the critical benefit-to-cost ratio of Eq. (4).
4.2.2. Structure coefficients. We now turn to a generalization of the critical benefit-to-cost
ratio for arbitrary 2 ˆ 2 games in which the payoff matrix is given by Eq. (9). Our main
result is the following:
Theorem 2. ρξ,A pwq ą ρpξ,B pwq for all sufficiently small w ą 0 if and only if
pa´ dq
„
Nf1 pξq f0 pξq
ˆ
1` 1
k
˙
´ 2f10 pξq ´ f1f0 pξq

` pb´ cq
„
Nf1 pξq f0 pξq
ˆ
1´ 1
k
˙
` f1f0 pξq

ą 0. (33)
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Proof. By the neutrality of the voter model, we have ρξ,A p0q ` ρpξ,A p0q “ 1, thus
ρξ,A pwq ą ρpξ,B pwq ðñ ρξ,A pwq ą 1´ ρpξ,A pwq
ðñ
´
ρξ,A pwq ´ ρξ,A p0q
¯
`
´
ρpξ,A pwq ´ ρpξ,A p0q
¯
ą 0 (34)
By the first-order expansion of Eq. (17), it follows that, for small w ą 0,
ρξ,A pwq ą ρpξ,B pwq ðñ
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
D pξtq
ı
dt`
ż 8
0
E0pξ
”
D pξtq
ı
dt ą 0. (35)
By Eqs. (16) and (17) and the neutrality of the voter model, we haveż 8
0
E0ξ
”
D pξtq
ı
dt`
ż 8
0
E0pξ
”
D pξtq
ı
dt
“ pa´ dq k
ˆż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f0f11 pξtq
ı
dt`
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f00 pξtq
ı
dt
˙
` pb´ cq k
ˆż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f0f10 pξtq
ı
dt`
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f01 pξtq
ı
dt
˙
, (36)
and all that remains is to determine the coefficients of a ´ d and b ´ c in Eq. (36). By
considering Eq. (36) with the payoff values of the donation game rather than an arbitrary
2ˆ 2 game, we obtainż 8
0
E0ξ
”
D pξtq
ı
dt`
ż 8
0
E0pξ
”
D pξtq
ı
dt
“ pb´ cq k
ˆż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f0f11 pξtq
ı
dt`
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f00 pξtq
ı
dt
˙
´ pb` cq k
ˆż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f0f10 pξtq
ı
dt`
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f01 pξtq
ı
dt
˙
. (37)
Thus, using Theorem 1, we see that, when b “ ´c,ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f0f11 pξtq
ı
dt`
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f00 pξtq
ı
dt “ 1
2
„
Nf1 pξq f0 pξq
ˆ
1` 1
k
˙
´ 2f10 pξq ´ f1f0 pξq

,
(38)
and, when b “ c,ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f0f10 pξtq
ı
dt`
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f1f01 pξtq
ı
dt “ 1
2
„
Nf1 pξq f0 pξq
ˆ
1´ 1
k
˙
` f1f0 pξq

, (39)
from which we obtain Eq. (33). 
In other words, ρξ,A pwq ą ρpξ,B pwq for all sufficiently small w ą 0 if and only if
σξa` b ą c` σξd, (40)
where σξ is the structure coefficient given by
σξ “ N
`
1` 1
k
˘
f1 ¨ f0 ´ 2f10 ´ f1f0
N
`
1´ 1
k
˘
f1 ¨ f0 ` f1f0 . (41)
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A simple calculation shows that
σξ “
`
b
c
˘˚
ξ
` 1`
b
c
˘˚
ξ
´ 1 , (42)
and, moreover, when the payoffs for the game are given by Eq. (10), this result reduces to
Eq. (32).
4.3. BD updating. Under BD updating, a player is first chosen to reproduce with proba-
bility proportional to fitness (effective payoff). A neighbor of the reproducing player is then
chosen uniformly-at-random for death, and the offspring of the reproducing player fills this
vacancy. The rate at which the player at vertex x is replaced by an i-player is then
piwi px, ξq “
ÿ
yPV : y„x
ewi py, ξq1tξpyq“iu
k
ÿ
zPV
”
ew1 pz, ξq ξ pzq ` ew0 pz, ξq pξ pzqı . (43)
The neutral version of this process (w “ 0) is a perturbation of the voter model, and we can
use techniques similar to those used for DB updating to establish our main results for BD
updating.
4.3.1. Critical benefit-to-cost ratios. Again, we first need a technical lemma:
Lemma 3. For i, j, l P t0, 1u, x P V , and ξ a configuration of cooperators and defectors, let
fijl px, ξq “ # tpy, z, vq P V ˆ V ˆ V : x „ y „ z „ v, ξ pyq “ i, ξ pzq “ j, and ξ pvq “ lu
k3
,
(44)
and form the averages fijl pξq via Eq. (12). For any configuration, ξ, we have the following
first-order expansion as w Ñ 0`:
ρξ,C pwq “ ρξ,C p0q ` w
˜
ak
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f110 pξtq
ı
dt` bk
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f010 pξtq
ı
dt
´ ck
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f101 pξtq
ı
dt´ dk
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f100 pξtq
ı
dt
¸
`O `w2˘ .
(45)
Proof. The first-order expansion of Eq. (17) is valid under BD updating as well [see 9,
Theorem 3.8], except that the function D pξq of Eq. (18) is defined in terms of the rates
piwi for BD updating rather than for DB updating. Writing e
w py, ξq “ ewi py, ξq whenever
ξ pyq “ i, we find that
D pξq “ d
dw
ˇˇˇ
w“0
˜
1
N
ÿ
xPV
piw1 px, ξq pξ pxq ´ 1N ÿ
xPV
piw0 px, ξq ξ pxq
¸
“
ÿ
xPV
ξ pxq
˜
1
N
dew px, ξq
dw
ˇˇˇ
w“0
´ 1
N2
ÿ
zPV
dew pz, ξq
dw
ˇˇˇ
w“0
¸
17
´
ÿ
xPV
ξ pxq
˜
1
Nk
ÿ
yPV : y„x
dew py, ξq
dw
ˇˇˇ
w“0
´ 1
N2
ÿ
zPV
dew pz, ξq
dw
ˇˇˇ
w“0
¸
“ k `af11 pξq ` bf10 pξq˘´ k `af111 pξq ` bf110 pξq ` cf101 pξq ` df100 pξq˘
“ k `af110 pξq ` bf010 pξq ´ cf101 pξq ´ df100 pξq˘ . (46)
We then obtain Eq. (45) by applying this calculation to the first-order expansion of Eq. (17).

Our main result for BD updating is the following:
Theorem 3. In the donation game, for any configuration, ξ, we have the following expansion
as w Ñ 0`:
ρξ,C pwq “ ρξ,C p0q ´ wk
2
!
bf10 pξq ` cNf1 pξq f0 pξq
)
`O `w2˘ . (47)
Proof. For the donation game, the function D of Eq. (46) simplifies to
D pξq “ ´kbf10 pξq ` kbf1f0 pξq ´ kcf10 pξq . (48)
Therefore, by the calculations of Lemma 2, we see thatż 8
0
E0ξ
”
D pξtq
ı
dt “ ´k
2
“
bf10 pξq ` cNf1 pξq f0 pξq
‰
, (49)
which gives Eq. (47) and completes the proof. 
Since bf10 pξq`cNf1 pξq f0 pξq ą 0 for each mixed state, ξ, it follows that ρξ,C pwq ă ρξ,C p0q
for all sufficiently small w ą 0 whenever ξ is not an absorbing state, so cooperation is always
suppressed by weak selection under BD updating.
4.3.2. Structure coefficients. Although cooperation is never favored by weak selection under
BD updating, we can still write down a condition for selection to favor strategy A in an
arbitrary 2ˆ 2 game whose payoff matrix is given by Eq. (9):
Theorem 4. ρξ,A pwq ą ρpξ,B pwq for all sufficiently small w ą 0 if and only if
pa´ dq “Nf1 pξq f0 pξq ´ f10 pξq‰` pb´ cq “Nf1 pξq f0 pξq ` f10 pξq‰ ą 0. (50)
Proof. The same argument given in the proof of Theorem 2 shows that Eq. (50) is equivalent
to ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
D pξtq
ı
dt`
ż 8
0
E0pξ
”
D pξtq
ı
dt
“ pa´ dq k
ˆż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f110 pξtq
ı
dt`
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f100 pξtq
ı
dt
˙
` pb´ cq k
ˆż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f010 pξtq
ı
dt`
ż 8
0
E0ξ
”
f101 pξtq
ı
dt
˙
ą 0. (51)
Solving for the coefficients of a´d and b´ c as in the proof of Theorem 2 gives Eq. (50). 
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Written differently, ρξ,A pwq ą ρpξ,B pwq for all sufficiently small w ą 0 if and only if
σξa` b ą c` σξd, (52)
where σξ is the structure coefficient given by
σξ “ Nf1 pξq f0 pξq ´ f10 pξq
Nf1 pξq f0 pξq ` f10 pξq . (53)
4.4. Strategic placement of cooperators for DB updating. We turn now to the con-
sequences of Theorem 1 for DB updating.
Proposition 1. Let k ě 2 be fixed. In the limit of large population size, N Ñ 8, the
critical benefit-to-cost ratio converges uniformly to k over all k-regular graphs, G, of size N
and all configurations, ξ, on G.
Proposition 1 follows immediately from the following technical result:
Lemma 4. For fixed k ě 2 and for N ą 4k2 ` 1 such that there exists a k-regular graph
with N vertices,
max
G
max
ξ
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
ˆ
b
c
˙˚
ξ
´ k
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ ď k p2k ` 1qpN ´ 1q1{2 ´ 2k , (54)
where G ranges over all k-regular graphs on N vertices, and, for each G, ξ ranges over all
mixed configurations.
Proof. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the reversibility of the random walk, both
f10 pξq and f1f0 pξq are bounded by
`
f1 pξq f0 pξq
˘1{2
. Therefore, for any such G and any
mixed ξ, it follows from Eq. (4) that
max
G
max
ξ
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
ˆ
b
c
˙˚
ξ
´ k
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ ď max0ănăN k p2k ` 1q
´
npN´nq
N2
¯1{2
N
´
npN´nq
N2
¯
´ 2k
´
npN´nq
N2
¯1{2 “ k p2k ` 1qpN ´ 1q1{2 ´ 2k , (55)
which completes the proof. 
Proposition 2. For all configurations obtained by placing an arbitrary (but fixed) number
of cooperators uniformly at random, the critical benefit-to cost ratio is given by Eq. (2) in
the main text.
Proof. Fix a k-regular graph with N vertices and, for 0 ă n ă N , let un denote the uni-
form distribution on the set of configurations, ξ, with exactly n cooperators. Since un is
independent of the graph geometry,
un
”
ξ pxq pξ pyqı “ n pN ´ nq
N pN ´ 1q (56)
whenever x ‰ y. Therefore, by the definitions of fi and fij in Eq. (11),
un
”
f10 pξq
ı
“ n pN ´ nq
N pN ´ 1q ; (57a)
un
”
f1f0 pξq
ı
“ pk ´ 1qn pN ´ nq
kN pN ´ 1q . (57b)
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It follows from Eq. (4) in the main text that the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for un isˆ
b
c
˙˚
un
“ un
“
k
`
Nf1 pξq f0 pξq ´ f10 pξq
˘‰
un
“
Nf1 pξq f0 pξq ´ kf10 pξq ´ kf1f0 pξq
‰ “ k pN ´ 2q
N ´ 2k , (58)
which is independent of n and coincides with Eq. (2). Furthermore, one can use Eq. (57) to
see that the coefficient of w on the right-hand side of Eq. (30) under the random placement
un is equal to
n pN ´ nq
2N pN ´ 1q
”
b pN ´ 2kq ´ ck pN ´ 2q
ı
, (59)
which is consistent with Theorem 1 in [9]. 
Remark 2 (Neutrality of random configurations). On an arbitrary finite, connected social
network, there is still an expansion in w for fixation probabilities that generalizes Eq. (17)
[see 9, Theorem 3.8]. Moreover, for the donation game and a configuration given randomly
by un, this expansion takes the form
ρun,C pwq “ ρun,C p0q ` w n pN ´ nqN pN ´ 1q pbΓ1 ´ cΓ2q `O
`
w2
˘
, (60)
where Γ1 and Γ2 are constants that are independent of n, b, and c. (See the proof of Lemma
3.1 and the discussion of ‘Bernoulli transforms’ on p. 655-656 in [9]. For the linearity of
the coefficient of w in b and c, see also [74].) By Eq. (60), the benefit-to-cost ratio for any
n-random configuration is independent of n, so random configurations with more cooperators
are neither more nor less conducive to cooperation than those with fewer.
For a fixed graph, G, let N0 be the maximum number of vertices that can be chosen in
such a way that no two of these vertices are within two steps of one another. We say that
a subset of vertices with this property is isolated. If the defectors in a configuration lie on
isolated vertices, then we say that defectors are isolated.
Proposition 3. If N ą 2k, then cooperation can be favored for a mixed configuration with
n cooperators whenever either 1 ď n ď N0 ` 1 or 1 ď N ´ n ď N0 ` 1.
Proof. For any configuration, ξ, with n cooperators, we have the inequalities
f10 pξq ď n
N
; (61a)
f1f0 pξq ď n pk ´ 1q
Nk
. (61b)
In Eq. (61), equality is obtained by a configuration with n isolated cooperators. Indeed,
f10 pξq and f1f0 pξq depend on the number of cooperator-defector paths and the number
of cooperator-anything-defector paths in ξ, respectively, and each such path is defined by
either an edge or two incident edges. On the other hand, at least one of these inequalities is
strict whenever ξ does not have isolated cooperators: If two cooperators are adjacent to one
another, then Eq. (61a) is strict; if two cooperators are adjacent to the same defector, then
Eq. (61b) is strict. In order to establish the proposition, we need to show that
Nf1 pξq f0 pξq ´ kf10 pξq ´ kf1f0 pξq ą 0 (62)
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since, then, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio of Eq. (4) is finite. Moreover, since Eq. (62) is
invariant under conjugation, it suffices to consider configurations with n cooperators, where
1 ď n ď N0 ` 1. By Eq. (61),
Nf1 pξq f0 pξq ´ kf10 pξq ´ kf1f0 pξq ě n pN ´ n´ 2k ` 1q
N
, (63)
so it suffices to establish the inequality N ´N0 ´ 2k ě 0.
Suppose, on the other hand, that N ´N0 ´ 2k ă 0. By the definition of N0, we can then
find a configuration with N´2k`1 isolated cooperators. Since each of these cooperators has
k neighboring defectors, and since none of these defectors have more than one cooperator as
a neighbor, we have
pN ´ 2k ` 1q pk ` 1q ď N ðñ N ď 2k, (64)
which contradicts the assumption that N ą 2k, as desired. 
Remark 3. The proof of Proposition 3 shows that whenever N ą 2k, in fact N ´ 2k ě
maxGN0 holds, where G ranges over all k-regular graphs on N vertices. This lower bound,
maxGN0, is sharp, which can be seen from the graph in Fig. 2(b) since this graph has size
9, is 4-regular, and satisfies N0 “ 1.
Proposition 4. Suppose that N ą 2k. Let ξ and ξ1 be configurations with n and n ´ 1
cooperators, respectively, such that defectors under both configurations are isolated. Then,ˆ
b
c
˙˚
ξ
ă
ˆ
b
c
˙˚
ξ1
. (65)
Proof. Since the defectors in both ξ and ξ1 are isolated, we haveˆ
b
c
˙˚
ξ
“ k pn´ 1q
n´ 2k ` 1; (66a)ˆ
b
c
˙˚
ξ1
“ k pn´ 2q
n´ 2k , (66b)
and it follows at once that
`
b
c
˘˚
ξ
ă ` b
c
˘˚
ξ1 since k ě 2, as desired. 
As a consequence of Proposition 4, we see that among the configurations with an isolated
strategy (cooperators or defectors), the minimum critical benefit-to-cost ratio is attained by
any configuration with just a single cooperator.
Proposition 5. For a k-regular graph with N ą 2k, we have the following:
(i) if N0 ě 2, then, for any n with 2 ď n ď N0, there exists a configuration with
n cooperators whose critical benefit-to-cost ratio is smaller than that of a random
configuration;
(ii) for any configuration with exactly two cooperators, such that, furthermore, these two
cooperators are neighbors, cooperation can be favored by weak selection. Moreover,
the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for this configuration is smaller than that of a random
configuration.
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Proof. By Proposition 4, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for any configuration with n ě 2
isolated cooperators is greater than the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for any configuration
with just a single cooperator. Recall now that this ratio for one cooperator is the same as
the ratio for n randomly-placed cooperators [9]. By Eq. (31), the critical benefit-to-cost ratio
for ξ is of the form
`
b
c
˘˚
ξ
“ Nξ
Dξ
for some voter-model expectations, Nξ and Dξ. Therefore,
by a simple averaging argument, we see that for each n with 2 ď n ď N0, there must exist
a configuration with n cooperators whose critical ratio is smaller than that of a random
configuration, Eq. (2), which completes the proof of part (i) of the proposition.
Let ξ be a configuration with two cooperators placed at adjacent vertices, x and y. If
T px, yq is the number of vertices adjacent to both x and y, then straightforward calculations
give
f10 pξq “ 2k ´ 2
Nk
; (67a)
f1f0 pξq “ 2k pk ´ 1q ´ 2T px, yq
Nk2
. (67b)
It then follows from the definition of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio thatˆ
b
c
˙˚
ξ
“ k
`
N ´ 3´ 1
k
˘
N ´ 2k ` 1
k
T px, yq , (68)
which is smaller than the ratio for random placement, Eq. (2), because N ą 2k, which gives
(ii). 
4.5. Examples. In Figs. 4 and 5, we give examples of the relationship between the config-
uration and the critical benefit-to-cost ratio on three small graphs.
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Figure 5. The effects of adding cooperators to the initial condition on a cycle with 10 vertices.
In panels (a)-(i), cooperators are added sequentially, with each new cooperator neighboring a co-
operator in the previous configuration. These panels clearly demonstrate that a configuration and
its conjugate have the same critical ratio and structure coefficient. Panels (j)-(l) show that when
cooperators are added in a different order, the critical ratios can increase rather than decrease. The
configurations of (j)-(l) each have isolated cooperators.
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